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I. INTRODUCTION 
―[P]roperty is not a right; it is a social function,‖1 wrote the French 
law professor Léon Duguit in 1912 when publishing a famous series of 
lectures he delivered in Buenos Aires the year before. This statement 
and Duguit’s work signaled a transformation in the way that property 
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 1.  ―Mais la propriété n’est pas un droit; elle est une fonction sociale.‖ LÉON DUGUIT, 
LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE CODE NAPOLÉON 21 (2d ed. 
1920) [hereinafter DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS].  
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would be understood in the Euro-American world. The statement led to 
the idea of what is now commonly called the ―social-obligation norm‖ 
or the ―social-function norm‖ of property. In essence, the idea of the 
social-obligation norm of property is that ―[p]roperty rights should have 
their share of social responsibility.‖2 These ideas contrasted with the 
dominant conception of property as an absolute right in which the 
owner is free to do or not to do whatever the owner likes with the 
property. Duguit’s characterization of private property limits it by 
requiring a minimum level of social utility beyond which property no 
longer exists. The scope of the social-obligation norm has varied in 
practice and has been subject to the personal or political interests of 
those charged with administering programs rooted in its understanding 
of property. Notions of the norm have been used to justify the 
expropriation and redistribution of property through land reform 
programs, the reshaping of cities through urban planning, the imposition 
of rent controls on landlords, and other limitations on the use of 
property by its owner.  
Today, scholars frequently cite Duguit as the founder of the social-
function norm.
3
 These references, however, seldom go beyond a quick 
cite to his foundational work on the topic. It seems that little is known 
about the genesis of his ideas, the sources he employed, and how some 
of these ideas eventually migrated into contemporary legal systems 
around the world.
4
 This Article seeks to explore the origins of Duguit’s 
                                                                                                                     
 2.  UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 31 (2000).  
 3.  See, e.g., Thomas T. Ankerson & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad: The Social 
Function Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95 (2006); Raymond 
R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 20 n.23 (1998); Charles A. Hale, The Civil Law Tradition and 
Constitutionalism in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The Legacy of Emilio Rabasa, 18 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 275 (2000); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Property Rights Protection Act: Does 
it Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 701 (1996); MATTEI, supra note 2, 
at 33; David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privitization: An Inquiry into the 
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 92 (2000). 
Although the most influencial source for these ideas, Duguit was not alone in spreading such 
views. See, e.g., José Ramón Narváez Hernández, El Código Privado-social: Influencia de 
Francesco Cosentini en el Código Civil Mexicano de 1928, 16 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE 
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 201-26 (2004). 
 4.  Historians of law and politics in Europe are so familiar with the notion of property’s 
social function that the topic seems to them better suited to a set piece for undergraduate 
examination rather than an area to be re-examined and explored. The early sources and ideas 
concerning broadly what is ―the social‖ are the building blocks of the modern European social 
welfare state. They are viewed as teleology rather than history, and to study them places the 
scholar, particulary the foreign scholar, within the camp of apologists for the modern European 
social welfare state and its policies. Likewise, in Latin America, the social-function norm of 
constitutional property is so common and so familiar that it has received little notice as a 
regional phenomenon. 
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thought on the topic as some necessary background work to the current 
debate concerning the social function of property.  
Duguit’s redefinition of property is one instance of the wider trend 
of the globalization of ―The Social‖ within law and legal thought noted 
by Duncan Kennedy.
5
 This view of property has led to many offshoots, 
including the reconsideration of intellectual property rights in 
relationship to the needs of society, the World Charter of Rights to the 
City, and Ugo Mattei’s ideas of a Latin American resistance to neo-
liberalism through a redefinition of property.
6
 Brazil has been 
particularly active in expanding these ideas. It has created an 
―environmental-function‖ norm of property in its Civil Code of 2002, as 
well as developing a social-function limitation on, not property, but 
contract.
7
 
The social-obligation norm of property stands in stark contrast to the 
classically liberal notions of property found in the Anglo-American 
tradition. This classical view is expressed well by F.H. Lawson and 
Bernard Rudden who write: 
In principle, owners can do anything they like with what they 
own: use it, use it up, neglect it, destroy it, give it away entirely 
or for a time, lend it, sell or lease it, pledge it, leave it by will, 
and so on. Furthermore the owner is perfectly free to do nothing 
at all with the thing: in principle, the law of property imposes no 
positive duties on an owner.
8
 
For modern property scholars, William Blackstone is often viewed 
as the predominant spokesperson for a conception of property in which 
                                                                                                                     
 5.  Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 649-74 (2003).  
 6.  Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in 
Brazil and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2006) (on the social function 
of property and the social function of the city and the World Charter on the Right to the City); 
Ugo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil Code, Property and Plunder. Time For a Latin American 
Alliance to Resist the Neo Liberal Order, 5 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS art. 3,1 (arguing that the 
countries of Latin America should ―unite to develop a new social constitution of Property‖); 
David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry into the 
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83-109 (2000). 
 7.  Luciano Benetti Timm, As Origens do Contracto no novo Código Civil: Uma 
Introdução à Função Social, Ao Welfarismo e ao Solidarismo Contratual (on file with author); 
Flavia Santinoni Vera, The Social Function of Property Rights in Brazil, 2006 LATIN AMERICAN 
AND CARIBBEAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (ALACDE) ANNUAL PAPERS, available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/bple/alacde/34 (describing effects of social function of property 
rights born in the Brazilian Constitution on the national economy). 
 8.  F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 2002) 
(emphasis in original). 
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the owner has ―sole and despotic dominion‖ over property.9 Blackstone 
has become inextricably linked to this definition of property despite 
recent scholarship revealing the complexity of Blackstone’s ideas on the 
topic.
10
 
The idea of the social-obligation norm of property is experiencing a 
renaissance in American legal thought.
11
 Gregory Alexander, a forceful 
advocate of the social-obligation norm, sounds a clarion call, ―[t]he time 
has come for property scholars to come to grips with the social-
obligation norm. . . . It is high time for property scholars to begin 
developing a social-obligation theory.‖12 As a corollary to the call, a 
recent ―Statement of Progressive Property‖ asserts that ―[w]e must look 
to the underlying human values that property serves and the social 
relationships it shapes and reflects.‖13 This Statement and the 
accompanying articles that form a law review symposium on the topic 
mark an important step in work of many scholars on the topic. They 
seek to appreciate and to strengthen this social-obligation understanding 
of property and to replace conceptions of property derived from an 
absolutist view and the economic analysis of legal institutions.
14
 In fact, 
                                                                                                                     
 9.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed. 
1979) (1765-69), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-201.htm. 
 10.  Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 754 (2009) (citing Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or 
Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-06 (1998) and David B. Schorr, How Blackstone 
Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 103 (2009), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol10/iss1/art5).  
 11.  There are a number of terms for the same idea including the ―social-function norm of 
property,‖ ―the social-function doctrine,‖ and sometimes the more general term, ―constitutional 
property.‖ The term ―social property‖ has a somewhat different meaning. See supra text 
accompanying notes 3-7. This Article uses both adjectives, ―social-obligation‖ and ―social-
function,‖ to mean the same thing. North American literature tends to use ―social-obligation,‖ 
while ―social-function‖ is a closer rendering of the original French terminology. 
 12.  Alexander, supra note 10, at 819. 
 13.  Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743 (2009).  
 14.  SPECIAL ISSUE ON PROPERTY AND OBLIGATION, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743-1071 (2009). 
Among these scholars, Gregory Alexander has been at the forefront of the effort. His fullest 
treatment of the topic entitled The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for 
American Takings Jurisprudence has been received with acclaim. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE 
GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS 
JURISPRUDENCE (2006) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE]; see M.C. Mirow, [Dear 
Justice Scalia], 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147-55 (2008) (reviewing ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL 
DEBATE). The term ―constitutional property‖ sits between the worlds of public law and private 
law for those schooled in civil law systems prevalent in Europe and Latin America. The very 
phrase ―constitutional property‖ indicates the liminal quality of the inquiry: ―constitution‖ 
signals public law; ―property‖ signals private law. Those trained in the common law will be less 
concerned about the term and its apparent self-contradictory aspects. The coinage, however, is 
appropriate because in much of the common law world, the social-function obligation of 
property is largely unknown. While questions of property’s social function often arise in the 
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these efforts offer a well-considered response to the dominant law and 
economics analysis that so many property professors and lawyers were 
raised on.
15
  
So fully developed is the modern dialogue on the social-obligation 
norm that scholars working in the field are apt to forget that the idea has 
a long intellectual history, and in 2010, we are celebrating the 
centennial of the clearest articulation of property’s social function. This 
new way of looking at property, the social-function model of property, 
was introduced in 1910 by the French doctoral student Henri Hayem, 
and a few years later, it was widely disseminated by Duguit. As 
Blackstone represents ―despotic ownership,‖ so Duguit has come to 
represent property’s ―social function.‖ 
The idea of property’s social function travelled the world following 
Duguit’s lectures in 1911 and their subsequent publication. In South 
America, Duguit’s lectures in Buenos Aires served to link his work and 
ideas to the legal development of the region. Based on Duguit’s work, 
drafters of Latin American constitutions changed the way property was 
defined in the first decades of the twentieth century. Before this regional 
shift, most constitutions followed classically liberal definitions of 
property as expressed in the French Civil Code and as found in the 
United States. Under this earlier view, property was absolute and 
subject only to the absolute power and arbitrary whim of the owner. The 
newer view considers property as having or as being defined by a social 
function.
16
 For example, evincing the influence of Duguit, the Chilean 
Constitution of 1925 states that ―[t]he exercise of the right of property is 
subject to the limitations or rules that the maintenance of the progress of 
the social order require.‖17 A more recent example is the Bolivian 
Constitution of 1993 which provides that everyone has a fundamental 
right to ―private property, individually or collectively, as long as it 
fulfills a social function.‖18 Similarly, the Constitution of El Salvador of 
                                                                                                                     
context of constitutional provisions addressing property, we must remember that the idea was 
also expressed in civil codes and classically private-law materials. Sometimes the debate was 
framed around the efficacy of code provisions that upheld liberal ideas of property and its use in 
the face of social definitions found in proposed or newly promulgated constitutional texts.  
 15.  Any first-year student of property reading Dukeminier’s standard text will have been 
exposed to the law and economics framework. The most recent edition is JESSE DUKEMINIER ET 
AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006). See generally MATTEI, supra note 2. For the social-obligation 
norm as a response to law and economics, see Alexander, supra note 10, at 750-51.  
 16.  M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
IN SPANISH AMERICA 205-06 (2004) [hereinafter MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW]. The book’s 
text is wrong in stating that the Colombian Constitution of 1886 declared that ―Property is a 
social function that implies obligations.‖ It was, in fact, the 1936 amendment to the Constitution 
of 1886 that added this language. Artículo 10, Acto Legislativo No. 1, Aug. 5, 1936. 
 17.  Chilean Constitution (1925), art. 10(10). 
 18.  Bolivian Constitution (1993), art. 7(1). 
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1983 provides ―[t]he right to private property in its social function is 
recognized and guaranteed.‖19 The idea has found expression 
throughout the world,
20
 the Constitutions of Germany and South Africa 
are prime examples of modern documents that embrace the social 
function.
21
 
In North America, Duguit’s ideas became known to the legal 
community when some of his work was translated and published by 
Harold Laski, an important English professor of political thought who 
lectured widely at McGill, Yale, and Harvard from 1914 to 1920.
22
 In 
fact, Laski’s translations of Duguit were published in New York.23 
Other works by Duguit were also translated and published in the United 
States.
24
 Through Laski and on their own, the works of Duguit found 
their way into the main body of American jurisprudence as ideas to be 
considered and reckoned with.
25
 Recent scholars working on this idea of 
property and related aspects in the United States include Gregory 
Alexander, Eric Freyfogle, Rebecca Lubens, Eduardo Peñalver, 
Jedediah Purdy, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, among 
others.
26
 Although the social-obligation norm has not been a dominant 
strand of understanding property in the United States, the idea that 
property has a civic or public side has been present in the United States 
since its founding.
27
 
                                                                                                                     
 19.  El Salvador Constitution (1983), art. 103. See generally Ankersen & Ruppert, supra 
note 3. 
 20.  Joseph R. Thome, Land Rights and Agrarian Reform: Latin American and South 
African Perspectives, Paper presented at Seminar on Good Government and Law, London, 27 
Mar. 1995 (copy on file with author). 
 21.  ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE, supra note 14, at 11-13, 97-197. See Rebecca 
Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of German and U.S. Law, 
24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 389 (2007). 
 22.  J.L. MONEREO PEREZ, LA DEMOCRACIA EN CRISIS: HAROLD J. LASKI 43-45 (Marceló, 
Barcelona: El Viejo Topo 2004) (on the influence of Duguit on Laski’s thought). See also 
Harold J. Laski, A Note on M. Duguit, 31 HARV. L. REV. 186 (1917). 
 23.  See generally LÉON DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (Frida Laski & Harold Laski 
trans., New York 1919).  
 24.  Léon Duguit, Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty, Contract, Liability, and 
Property, reprinted in 11 THE CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES, THE PROGRESS OF 
CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 135 (Layton Bartol Register & Ernest 
Bruncken trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1969) (1918). This work was reviewed by 
Roscoe Pound in 34 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1920) (making particular note of the social function of 
property). 
 25.  Jeremy Paul, Felix Cohen’s Brand of Legal Realism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 597 (2006); 1 
ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 181, 184-89 (1959); 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 138 (1959). 
 26.  Alexander, supra note 10, at 747-48 nn.6 & 7. See also Lubens, supra note 21, at 389. 
 27.  Alexander, supra note 10, at 748; see generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 
1776-1970 (1997); see also Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of 
Property, 6 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 228-30 (1993). 
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Before turning to Duguit and his theory, a brief mention concerning 
terminology and translation is necessary. The roots of the social-
function norm lie in France. Writing in English about French ideas 
presents some difficulties in legal terminology and comparative law. 
―Propriété‖ in French can mean both ―ownership‖ and ―property.‖28 
The most common word for ―property‖ in its legal sense in French is 
―les biens.‖29 When translating French writers, the sense of particular 
phrases would often dictate that it would be better to render the word as 
―ownership;‖ thus, the phrase ―ownership is a social function‖ is more 
easily understood than ―property is a social function‖ to most English 
speakers. Indeed, Joseph Singer captures the French idea nicely when 
he writes, ―Owners have obligations; they have always had 
obligations.‖30 Nonetheless, the developed English secondary literature 
on the topic prefers the term ―property‖ to render the French word 
―propriété.‖ For consistency, particularly consistency in ideas, I have 
decided to perpetuate this somewhat minor error or ambiguity. In 
English, the social-function norm or the social-function obligation has 
been tied to the word ―property‖ and recently to the phrase 
―constitutional property.‖ To write more correctly about the French 
ideas of the ―social function of ownership,‖ would convey a clearer 
meaning of the idea. If we were to focus on ―ownership‖ rather than 
―property,‖ the human instrumentality of ownership would more clearly 
connect the activity of owning property to societal obligations. 
Nonetheless, the term ―social function of property‖ is used here because 
the English-language scholarship has already settled on ―property‖ and 
to introduce the minor correction of ―ownership‖ would, I think, create 
needless confusion. 
II. LÉON DUGUIT 
Léon Duguit was born in 1859 in Libourne, France, about 20 miles 
northeast of Bordeaux, where he spent his early years. He then studied 
law at the University of Bordeaux and rose swiftly in the academic 
world. By 1880 he had obtained his first law degree, a doctorate through 
competition, and had received a dispensation for his young age to begin 
preparing for the agrégation which he later obtained in 1882. His first 
teaching position was at the University of Caen, where he taught legal 
                                                                                                                     
 28.  OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY 654 (2d ed. 1997). 
 29.  JEAN-LOUIS HALPÉRIN, HISTORIE DU DROIT DES BIENS (2008); OXFORD-HACHETTE 
FRENCH DICTIONARY 1591 (2d ed. 1997). 
 30.  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 18 (2000), 
cited in Alexander, supra note 10, at 818. 
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history.
31
 With Edmond Villey, he founded a review on political 
economy at the University of Caen, Revue d’economie politique. In 
1886, he returned to the University of Bordeaux, his academic home for 
the next forty years.
32
  
In Bordeaux, Duguit held regular meetings with academic friends. 
Importantly for our study of Duguit’s social thought, Émile Durkheim 
was among these close friends from whom Duguit borrowed and 
applied various approaches to law. Establishing his place as a professor 
of constitutional law, Duguit published his first article in 1896 in the 
Revue de droit public. It was, however, his two-volume publication on 
the state, l’État, in 1901 and 1903, that gave him national prominence 
and set the structure for his future works. Over the next decade, he held 
various positions at the University of Coimbra, the University of Cairo, 
and at the École des Hautes Études Sociales and continued to publish 
regularly. From 1911 forward, he published several major works 
including his lectures in Buenos Aires and a five-volume work on 
constitutional law, Traité de droit constitutionnel. He was active in 
university life, local politics, and for social causes within the city and 
region. He was a member of the Union for Truth, a Dreyfus society, and 
attended meetings of the Cercle Voltaire.
33
  
During the First World War, Duguit served as an administrator in the 
army and ran a military hospital. He lost one of his two sons in the war. 
In the 1920s, Duguit continued with his academic work and with several 
visiting positions abroad: Columbia University in New York in 1920 
and 1921, the University of Coimbra in 1923, and the University of 
Bucharest in 1925. In 1926, with Hans Kelsen and Franz Weyr, he 
founded an international review of legal theory, the Revue 
internationale de théorie du droit, and in 1927, he participated in the 
founding of the International Institute for Public Law. He died in 
1928.
34
 
In 1911 over the course of two months, Léon Duguit, this well-
known French law professor and author, delivered a series of lectures in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. The topic, how the civil law had changed 
since the Code Napoléon of 1804, was an opportunity for Duguit to 
bridge the intellectual traditions of France and Argentina and of Europe 
and America. He flattered his audience of Argentines by noting that 
they were the professional elite of the country and that the topic was 
                                                                                                                     
 31.  DICTIONNAIRE HISTORIQUE DES JURISTES FRANÇAIS XIIE-XXE SIÈCLE 271 (Patrick 
Arabeyre et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter DHJF]. 
 32.  Id. at 271-72. 
 33.  Id. at 272. 
 34.  Id. For additional biographical information, see José Luis Monereo Pérez & José 
Calvo González, Léon Diguit (1859-1928): Jurista de una Sociedad en Transformación, 4 
REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483-86 (2005). 
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appropriate because their respective countries had come, more or less, 
to the same level of civilization.
35
 One might speculate that this was 
exactly what a room full of Argentines at the beginning of the twentieth 
century would have delighted in.  
The lectures were an opportunity of another sort. Duguit used the 
series to expound and advocate a new view of private law and of 
property. Duguit’s discussion of property, the sixth and final lecture in 
the series, was the most important, controversial, and lasting part of the 
lectures. Duguit transcribed and published the lectures in Paris just a 
few months after their delivery in Buenos Aires; a second Paris edition 
appeared in 1920.
36
 In his preface to the second edition, Duguit 
summarized the argument he proposed: ―In the sixth lecture, I have 
developed the idea that capitalist property, and particularly real 
property, is increasingly less of a subjective individual right and more 
of a social function.‖37 
He repeated the essential language of the sixth lecture this way: 
―Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the social 
function of the possessor of wealth.‖38 He coined two hyphenated words 
to describe the old notion of property or ownership and the new: right-
property (propriété-droit) and function-property (propriété-fonction).
39
 
This lecture and its subsequent circulation in France, the United 
States, and Latin America provided the most important source by 
Duguit concerning the social function doctrine of property, now 
commonly called the social-obligation norm of property. North 
American scholars examining the nature of property referred to it.
40
 
Latin American constitutionalist reconsidering the definition of property 
in their constitutions also referred to it.
41
 Writing later in 1923, Duguit 
made it clear that he considered this lecture in 1911 as the origin of his 
assertions concerning the social function of property.
42
 Although other 
                                                                                                                     
 35.  DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at i. 
 36.  Id. There were also editions of the work in Spanish published in Madrid in 1915 and 
1926. Hale, supra note 3, at 276, n.45. Another author mentioned a Spanish translation from 
1921. Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 488 n.15, 546. 
 37.  ―J’ai, dans la sixième conférence, développé cette idée que la propriété capitaliste, et 
particulièrement la propriété foncière, cesse de plus en plus d’ être un droit subjectif de 
l’individu pour devenir une fonction sociale.‖ DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 
iv. 
 38.  ―La propriété n’est plus le droit subjectif du propriétaire ; elle est la fonction sociale 
de détenteur de la richesse.‖ Id. at v. 
 39.  Id. at vi. 
 40.  See supra text accompanying notes 23-28. 
 41.  An early example from Chile, ACTAS OFICIALES DE LAS SESIONES CELEBRADAS POR 
LA COMISIÓN Y SUB-COMISION ENCARGADAS DEL ESTUDIO DEL PROYECTO DE NUEVA 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA 114-19 (1925). 
 42.  LÉON DUGUIT, 3 TRATÉ DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 619 (2d ed. 1923) (Paris, 
Fontemoing & cie, 1911) [hereinafter DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL]. 
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works of Duguit and French thinkers contributed to the shift, this sixth 
lecture transplanted the French roots of the social function of property 
into foreign soil in many countries around the world. 
This radical, new definition of property was not an isolated 
statement but arose in the context of Duguit’s life work, and it must be 
read in the context of both the six lectures he delivered in Argentina and 
of his work on the social function up to its dissemination abroad.  
Duguit’s view of the state was that its goal was not to exercise 
imperium, but rather to fulfill its social function to collective service.
43
 
All other lesser institutions, such as legal obligations or property, should 
also fulfill this general function. Duguit’s assertions about the social-
function norm of property were, in fact, a very small slice of his much 
larger life’s work on the nature and function of the state. It was not, 
however, a deviation or detour from this work. Duguit’s view of 
property fit in with his overall theory of the state. His ideas also took on 
a later significance that neither Duguit nor his contemporaries could 
have expected.
44
 
Duguit can be correctly viewed as one of the French anti-formalists 
who rejected the deductive science of an autonomous law so prevalent 
in nineteenth-century Europe.
45
 With the aim of establishing the limits 
of the state by law, he sought to apply the more empirically based 
analyses of the social sciences to law.
46
 The writings of Herbert Spencer 
strongly influenced his early writings on the law and state, and Duguit 
used such biological and organic approaches to analyze the function and 
change of law and the state. Although he later left this school of 
thought, Duguit kept certain central aspects of this approach throughout 
his academic life. These included an empirically based scientific 
methodology and a core belief in the value of sociological modes of 
understanding law and the state.
47
  
Despite its assertions of realist and scientific approach, the body of 
Duguit’s work to the modern reader appears to be deeply imbedded in 
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophical 
                                                                                                                     
 43.  DHJF, supra note 31, at 273. 
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discussions of the nature of law and of the nature of the state. It was this 
work that his contemporaries found most important and interesting.
48
 
Indeed, on Duguit’s death, one of his colleagues, Roger Bonnard also of 
Bordeaux, stated of him: ―I am persuaded that the day will come when 
one will think of two great periods in the science of the law: one before 
him, the other after him.‖49 While not attached to Duguit’s name, this 
was certainly a transformative period in methodological approaches to 
law, and in some ways, Bonnard’s prophesy was correct. Duguit was at 
the center of a critique and reconceptualization of the commonly held 
ideas about both public and private law.
50
 
Thus, using his positivist, realist approach, most of Duguit’s work 
can be characterized as critiquing existing theories and understandings 
of the law and the state. In many respects, Duguit’s targets were defined 
by the existing literature. Duguit took on what he considered the 
metaphysical assumptions, rather than the scientific conclusions, about 
law expressed in contemporary works by Rudolf von Ihering and Georg 
Jellinek. Notions of subjective rights were not supported by the 
conclusions Duguit obtained through his positivist method. In addition 
to rejecting the accepted idea of subjective rights, Duguit also 
reconsidered the predominant idea that juridical acts were the result of 
assertions of the wills of the authors of the act, or what was commonly 
called the Willenstheorie. In Duguit’s view, metaphysical ideas about 
the law and critiques of them had to follow from empirical scientific 
observations about the law, rather than precede such observations.
51
 
Thus, Duguit’s realist approach critiqued the current notions of 
subjective rights, the will theory of juridical acts, the auto limitation of 
the state, and the schools of natural and contractarian law as represented 
in divine will and social contract theories of the state and law.
52
 
Following Émile Durkheim, the preeminent French sociological thinker 
of the period, Duguit sought legal rules that reflected social rules and 
social interdependence, or solidarity, leading to his analysis of the social 
state and the rule of law—the true legitimacy for government.53  
Duguit’s thought in general and on the social function of property in 
relationship to social solidarity and social interdependence was guided 
strongly by the works of Comte and Durkheim.
54
 In fact, France was 
                                                                                                                     
 48.  Id. at 24. 
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fertile ground for the development of Duguit’s ideas related to the social 
function of property. The fifty years leading up to Duguit’s work had 
witnessed the rise of a school of social thinkers and writers. The broad 
ideas of ―solidarity,‖ stemming from the writings of the Swiss religious 
philosopher Charles Secrétan were added to social aspects by the 
French jurist and political philosopher Léon Victor Bourgeois who more 
fully developed the idea of ―social solidarity‖ around the turn of the 
century.
55
 Charles Gide was also instrumental in the development of 
these ideas.
56
 Thus, in addition to maintaining a sociological approach 
borrowed from Durkheim, Duguit also adopted Durkheim’s idea of 
―social solidarity‖ as a central principle for his ideas concerning the law 
and the state.
57
 Nonetheless, his unwillingness to adopt the idea of the 
collective conscience, an important aspect of Durkheim’s approach, was 
a substantial departure from Durkheim’s thought.58 Duguit also cited 
and quoted Comte as a central influence on his development of the 
social-function norm.
59
 Indeed, Duguit’s very method of observation 
and continued observation has its origin in Comte’s positivism.60 
One aspect of such an approach was the collapsing of the traditional 
distinction between private and public law, a set feature of the civil law 
since Roman times.
61
 Just as assumptions concerning subjective rights 
could not be supported in the area of public law, they could not be 
supported in private law.
62
 This idea was not widely accepted, and 
Duguit received criticism from those who defended the more traditional 
German doctrine, such as Raymond Carré de Malberg, and from 
classical jurists, such as the legal historian Adhémar Esmein and his 
colleague at Bordeaux, Julien Bonnecase.
63
 His debates on the nature of 
law with Maurice Hauriou of Toulouse, who upheld more traditional 
objective notions of law, have been chronicled.
64
 Because he refused to 
                                                                                                                     
 55.  Andreas Timmermann, “Soziale Solidarität” und Agrarreform im 20. 
Jahrhundert:zur Wirkung der Rechtsschule Léon Duguits—ein Überseeischer Vergleich, 37 
VERFASSUNG UND RECHT ÜBERSEE 168, 172 (2004). 
 56.  Id. at 172-73; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 539-40. 
 57.  Bonnard, supra note 44, at 36. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 159; 1 DUGUIT, DROIT 
CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 268 (citing AUGUSTE COMTE, SYSTÈME DE POLITIQUE 
POSITIVE 156 (Paris, Larousse 1892)); DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 618-
19 (quoting a passage from COMTE, supra). 
 60.  POUND, supra note 25, at 186-87. 
 61.  DHJF, supra note 31, at 273; Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 495-96. 
 62.  Bonnard, supra note 44, at 16. 
 63.  DHJF, supra note 31, at 273. 
 64.  Id. See C. Eisenmann, Deux Théoriciens du droit: Duguit et Hauriou, REVUE 
PHILOSOPHIQUE 231-79 (1930); M. Milet, L. Duguit et M. Hauriou: Quarante ans de 
Controverse Juridico-politique. Essai D’analyse Socio-rhétorique (1889-1929) in LES JURISTES 
FACE AU POLITIQUE : LE DROIT, LA GAUCHE, LA DOCTRINE SUR LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE 85-
2010] THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NORM OF PROPERTY: DUGUIT, HAYEM, AND OTHERS 203 
 
accept the notion of a collective conscience, Duguit was even pushed 
aside by other disciples of Durkheim, who otherwise would have made 
up his natural intellectual circle. Duguit’s positions on the law were not 
static throughout his life; for example, after 1914 he amended his ideas 
concerning the goals of positive law to include the attainment of justice, 
a shift that led some to categorize his views as espousing ideas of 
natural law. Despite his sometimes controversial positions, he left an 
important mark on the teaching of public law at Bordeaux from whence 
several of his students went on to academic distinction.
65
 When Duguit 
delivered and published these lectures in 1911 and 1912, he was already 
well established as a law professor at the University of Bordeaux and as 
one of France’s premiere minds in the area of public law. Thus, the 
lectures reflect the confident work of a maturing scholar, then in his 
early fifties.  
III. THE BUENOS AIRES LECTURES 
The lectures provide us the best window into Duguit’s thought on 
the social function of property. In his Buenos Aires lectures, Duguit 
argued that private law had recently undergone a transformation from a 
metaphysical and individualist system to a realist and social (réaliste et 
socialiste) system.
66
 He effectively and repeatedly returned to this 
theme in the course of his six lectures entitled: (1) Subjective Rights 
and the Social Function; (2) The New Conception of Liberty; (3) The 
Autonomy of the Will; (4) The Juridical Act; (5) The Contract and 
Responsibility; and (6) The Social Function of Property. Although it is 
unlikely Duguit would have expected the sixth lecture on property’s 
social function to have created the most interest, by the time of the 
second publication of the lectures in 1920, Duguit’s preface to the 
second edition focused on this topic. He used the second preface to 
restate his case for the social-function norm and to set out several 
examples of laws enacted after his lecture, from 1916, 1918, and 1919, 
to illustrate the growth of the norm. One set of laws, the loi Méline 
required the cultivation of farmland when the owners of the land refused 
to grow crops. Aimed at farmers who had been mobilized for war, the 
                                                                                                                     
121 (Carlos Miguel Herrera ed. 2003); M. Waline, Les Idées Maîtrisses de deux Grand 
Publicistes Français: Léon Duguit et Maurice Hauriou, L’ANNÉE POLITIQUE 16 (Nov. 1929). 
For a recent discussion of their differences, see Pérez & González, supra note 34, at 505-08. 
 65.  DHJF, supra note 31, at 273. 
 66.  DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 8-9. To avoid an ambiguity Duguit 
himself addressed, I use the term ―social‖ to translate his term ―socialiste‖ which he made clear 
was not aligned with the socialist party and its political and economic aims. Id. at 8. 
204 FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22 
 
act reflected Duguit’s ideas of the social function.67 The implementation 
of the law, however, appears to have been impractical.
68
 Another law 
forced the continuation of urban leases and required a limitation on 
increases of rents.
69
 In hindsight, the lectures can be read as leading to 
this final and most important topic within the context of the series, and 
Duguit might have planned that the series would culminate in the 
lecture on property as a new and controversial topic. 
The first lecture was both an introduction to the general theme of the 
transformation in the law and an introduction to Duguit’s method. 
Duguit asserted that his approach embodied a scientific, impartial 
observation of the law without predetermined conclusions.
70
 He stated 
that the changes making up this transformation were more or less 
universal to all American and European countries ―at the same level of 
civilization, and in any case all the countries of Latin America.‖71 
In Duguit’s story of legal development and change in these 
countries, the Declaration of Rights of Man (1789) and the Code 
Napoléon (1804) were not heroes. Instead, these formative documents 
of western law enshrined a metaphysical, individual, and resultant 
formalist approach to law based on the power of the individual will and 
subjective rights.
72
 They enshrined this approach to law by making 
property a right and by making the enjoyment of that right the most 
absolute possible.
73
 The new transformation, the social function of law, 
was a reaction against the concept of law found in these documents.
74
 
Duguit’s new, realist, social view of law and legal institutions shunned 
these earlier notions of rights found throughout Europe, and, as 
mentioned by Duguit, in the Argentine Civil Code of the period.
75
 
Under the former framework, the state became the protector of 
individual rights.
76
 In Duguit’s view, this obscured the more important 
function of the state to promote the place of humans in society.
77
 
Instead, Duguit suggests that subjective rights should have been and 
were  replaced  by the social function.
78
 The first lecture concluded with 
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2010] THE SOCIAL-OBLIGATION NORM OF PROPERTY: DUGUIT, HAYEM, AND OTHERS 205 
 
brief examples demonstrating how the social function redefined liberty 
and property.
79
  
The second lecture developed the idea of liberty. Repeating the 
tropes of social function and a realist and social conception of law, 
Duguit called on the work of his ―eminent colleague and friend‖ 
Durkheim to emphasize the importance of social solidarity and social 
interdependence.
80
 The individual was properly placed as a member of 
society and was to carry out his or her social function. Drawing on 
Comte to assert this idea, Duguit expanded on these ideas to situate law 
and legal institutions in society.
81
 To describe the social function 
further, Duguit first set out more fully the elements of the traditional 
civil system that he hoped was being abandoned. According to Duguit, 
the essential elements of this traditional system also provided the 
overall general structure of his lectures. The four element are individual 
liberty, an inviolable right of property, contract, and individual 
responsibility for fault.
82
 Against this structure, Duguit placed the 
individual’s role in society.83 Using examples drawn from laws 
regarding suicide, dueling, and regulating working hours, Duguit 
demonstrated that the social function had modified or limited more 
established notions of liberty and freedom of contract.
84
 
In his third lecture, Duguit attacked the relationship of the autonomy 
of the will theory of law to juridical acts.
85
 Such a theory might have 
worked for individualist societies like ancient Rome or Europe and 
America in the early nineteenth century, but Duguit saw European and 
American societies of the early twentieth century as defined by their 
social and associational character.
86
 He critiqued a substantial body of 
French and German writings on legal personality to argue that the social 
reality no longer reflected such assumptions.
87
 Duguit’s world now was 
filled with corporations, associations, societies, and public utilities all 
easily carrying the fiction of juridical persons.
88
 Just as individuals must 
fulfill social missions, so too must these various groups serve a social 
function.
89
  Duguit  found  that  the  autonomy  of  their collective wills, 
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really an individual will in Duguit’s thought, was inconsistent with the 
new realist and social function he observed.
90
  
In the fourth lecture, Duguit turned to the juridical act as an 
expression of the autonomy of will.
91
 His first examples were taken 
from contract law and how the social function had modified the 
traditional understanding of contractual relationship. Duguit stated that 
internal acts of the will were not protected by law; only those 
declarations of will that produce social acts were protected.
92
 Therefore, 
when codes enforce only licit contracts, an element of the social is 
introduced to limit the will of the individual. Duguit used contracts to 
establish brothels, loans for betting, and bequests contingent on not 
marrying as examples where the social function voided the will of the 
individual.
93
 In the other direction, he found examples where bequests 
that would normally be void were enforced as valid because of their 
clear social purposes. These included the founding of hospitals and the 
famous case of Edmond de Goncourt’s will that established a literary 
society in the Goncourt name.
94
 
Duguit continued to address contracts in the fifth lecture and added a 
discussion of torts, or civil responsibility for negligent acts. The famous 
French civilian Planiol is introduced as a staunch defender of an 
individualist, autonomist will approach to contract.
95
 To counter this 
view of contract, Duguit noted the rise of contracts of adhesion, the 
ambiguous legal nature of posting a letter, collective contracts for work, 
and government concessions, all as instances that increasingly 
challenged the traditional two-wills theory of contract.
96
 For Duguit, 
these new contractual relationships were best seen as representing the 
social function. In the area of tort law, Duguit also asserted a shift from 
individual to group responsibility reflecting the new social function of 
law.
97
 Here, Duguit pointed to workers’ compensation schemes that 
functioned irrespective of fault and the new areas of responsibility 
assumed by public services when damages occurred.
98
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IV. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY IN THE 
BUENOS AIRES LECTURES 
These five lectures laid the groundwork for the sixth lecture, on 
property, the most important for our purposes and, perhaps, the most 
controversial in the course of Duguit’s presentation. Duguit noted that, 
like other fundamental areas of law, property had become socialized.
99
 
For Duguit, this meant two things. First, individual property was no 
longer an individual right but had become a social function.
100
 Second, 
aggregates of collective wealth protected by law were becoming more 
numerous.
101
  
Duguit first outlined the idea of property found in Roman law and 
expressed in the Declaration of Rights of 1789, the Code Napoléon, and 
the Argentine Civil Code.
102
 The consequences of this absolute 
conception of property included lands being left without cultivation, 
city lots without construction, vacant and unmaintained houses, and 
unproductive capital goods.
103
 For Duguit, these consequences were 
unacceptable in the modern context of social interdependence. Thus, 
Duguit concluded for property: ―Property is no longer the subjective 
right of the owner; it is the social function of the holder of wealth.‖104 
Duguit found this new definition of property in the work of Auguste 
Comte who, in 1850, wrote of the public function of each citizen and 
the concomitant idea that property carries with it an ―indispensable 
social function.‖105 Duguit also extrapolated this definition from Jean 
Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil who wrote of the social functions of the 
capitalist, owner, and trader.
106
 In addition to these authors, Duguit cited 
four other works to develop the idea of the social-function norm of 
property.
107
 
Duguit was emphatic that the adoption of this definition of property 
did not make him a redistributionist or someone analyzing property and 
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ownership in the context of class struggle. He stated that he was not 
advocating or predicting the disappearance of individual property. He 
was only chronicling a modification in its nature that he had 
observed.
108
 
Duguit next addressed the scarcity of legislation effecting a social-
function definition of property. In other words, there were no laws that 
created obligations to farm uncultivated lands, to maintain houses, or to 
make capital productive.
109
 Despite the lack of such legislation, Duguit 
noted some aspects of the social-function norm attaching to property in 
the case law of France.
110
 Furthermore, by the time of the second 
edition, 1920, Duguit could point to some legislative examples as 
well.
111
 These cases illustrated, in his view, property responding to the 
common good.
112
 Recent cases prohibited land owners from erecting 
screens, false chimneys, or excavating on their lands without reason.
113
 
Scientific progress and social solidarity resulted in legislation 
affecting property in another way. Laws requiring the running and 
maintenance of electric and telephone lines without payment for 
expropriation indicated that individual property was being limited by its 
social function. Duguit reveled in the contradiction with Article 522, 
section 1 of the Code Napoléon: ―Ownership of the land implies 
ownership above and below it.‖114 Duguit’s final example of the 
increasingly social function of property was taken from recent 
developments concerning the church use of lands that formally had been 
confiscated and owned by the state.
115
 
Although Duguit’s views on property were concentrated in this sixth 
lecture, these ideas were also woven through the course of the lectures. 
For example, when addressing the two express rights under the 
Declaration of Rights, liberty and property, Duguit repeated the central 
idea another way: ―[P]roperty is not a right; it is a social function.‖116 
Similarly, property came into the lectures again when Duguit discussed 
the autonomy of will: ―The subjective right of property does not exist 
more than the other rights. I will only say that if certain property is put 
to a common use recognized as conforming to social solidarity, this use 
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ought to be protected.‖117 Thus, although the theme of the social 
function of property was most pronounced at the end of the lectures, 
Duguit introduced these ideas from the beginning and repeated them 
throughout the series of talks. 
In sum, the series of lectures both described certain changes in law 
that Duguit observed and argued for a different foundation for the 
understanding of law and legal systems. Ideas of social solidarity and 
social interdependence were used to wipe out the prevalent notion of 
subjective rights and the autonomy of the will in maintaining private 
law institutions such as contract and property. Duguit’s analysis and 
prescriptive suggestions were increasingly specific and brought him 
finally to a complete reconsideration of the nature of property, a 
perspective he was to leave in Latin America after the lectures and 
disseminate in Europe and North America. 
V. THE BUENOS AIRES LECTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
DUGUIT’S WORK 
Duguit’s lectures must also be placed in the context of his other 
works, particularly his writings leading up to the lectures in Buenos 
Aires in 1911. The work that established Duguit’s place as a national 
and international academic was his two volumes on the State, l’État: le 
droit objectif et la loi positive published in 1901 and l’État: les 
gouvernants et les agents published in 1903.
118
 Duguit’s study and 
exposition of the state and his lectures on the changes in private law are 
complementary. Each work begins with the idea of social solidarity, 
subjective rights, and juridical acts, but where l’État turned away from 
law per se to examine governments, their structures and actions, the 
lectures turn toward the private law to examine the effects of this 
characterization on them. Thus, in their beginning sections these works 
are similar in content, although the level of discourse and analysis is 
deeper in the books and easier to follow in the lectures.  
In passages from l’État, Duguit presented and questioned ideas that 
later gained greater force and clarity of expression in the lectures. For 
example, early in l’État, Duguit critiqued the current state of affairs 
concerning the positive law by noting that all present legislation in 
codes was based on the idea of the individual right, but rights were, in 
                                                                                                                     
117.  ―Le droit subjectif de propriété n’existe pas plus que les autres droits. Je dirai 
seulement que si des biens sont affectés à un but collectif reconnu conforme à la solidarité 
sociale, cette affectation doit être protégée.‖ Id. at 72.  
118.  1 LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT : LE DROIT OBJECTIF ET LA LOI POSITIVE (Paris, Fontemoing 
& cie. 1901) [hereinafter 1 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT]; 2 LÉON DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT : LES GOUVERNANTS ET 
LES AGENTS (Paris, Fontemoing & cie. 1903) [hereinafter 2 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT]. 
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his analysis, exclusively social.
119
 The themes later repeated in the 
lectures are discussed at length, but somewhat more tentatively, in 
l’État: social solidarity, solidarity as a division of work, the tendency of 
groups and associations to increase in number in recent times, and the 
lack of an essential difference between private and public law.
120
 The 
text of l’État indicates that for these areas of thought, Duguit was again 
strongly influenced by Comte’s ideas of social dynamism and 
Durkheim’s treatise from 1893.121 As in the lectures, Duguit included a 
section on the juridical act in his work on the state. The analysis is 
similar; in l’État, Duguit critiqued the notion of subjective rights.122 
Later, he began to question the nature of property and if the individual 
will to create property was a subjective right of the individual. In l’État, 
Duguit did not come to the social function solution he read in his 
lectures, but determined that it was an objective power that implicated 
the social rule of the time, a rule that changed as the elements of social 
solidarity changed.
123
 This earlier work gives the reader a glimpse into 
Duguit’s formative thought on property. It reveals, for example, Duguit 
combining notions of ownership, property, and the social function 
through the social role of the owner.
124
 
Thus, l’État demonstrates Duguit’s earlier thought on many of the 
same themes he later presented in his lectures: the failure of subjective 
rights, limitations on law when read through a lens of social solidarity, 
and underlying social function limitations on legal acts and rights. The 
bulk, however, of the two volume work headed in a substantially 
different direction from the lectures. Most of l’État addresses the nature 
and will of government, the legislative will, the general nature of 
positive law, nations and sovereignty, representative government, 
parliaments, chiefs of state, government agents and delegation, and 
decentralized governments.
125
  
Overall, l’État provides little information on Duguit’s ideas on 
property which were so well presented in the lectures. Nonetheless, the 
reader of l’État observes some nascent ideas regarding property that 
took fuller and clearer form in the lectures. To repeat the central 
language   on   property  by  Duguit  in  1911,  we  find  in  the  lectures: 
 
                                                                                                                     
119.  1 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, supra note 118, at 13.  
120.  Id. at 16, 47, 58-62, 187. 
121.  For Comte, id. at 17; for Durkheim, id. at 23 (citing E. DURKHEIM, DE LA DIVISION DU 
TRAVAIL SOCIAL (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1893)). For ideas of the social, Duguit also makes 
considerable use of RUDOLF VON IHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1877). Id. at 170. 
122.  Id. at 141-43.  
123.  Id. at 152. 
124.  Id. at 153. 
125.  Id.; 2 DUGUIT, L’ÉTAT, supra note 118. 
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―Property is no longer the subjective right of the owner; it is the social 
function of the possessor of wealth.‖126 
Ten years earlier, his formulations were less direct and more 
reserved. At one point in l’État, Duguit wrote: ―Property is not a 
subjective right, it implies an ensemble of juridically possible 
intentions, indefinitely renewable; it is, in fact, a state.‖127 
Repeating the same formula for interrogating the idea of property, 
Duguit a bit later in the same study wrote: ―Property is not a subjective 
right; it is a fact condition of objective powers, and this [is so], however 
it might be constituted.‖128 
Thus, by 1901, Duguit had clearly developed his critique of 
subjective rights as related to property, and indeed, the law in general, 
but he had not yet developed a clear way to express the social function 
norm as it related to property.  
L’État, however, also provides a window into the development of the 
social-function norm of property. When discussing functionaries of the 
state, Duguit noted that judges, professors, officers, and ministerial 
officers like notaries held something like a property right in their 
positions. The irremovable qualities of these offices made their holders 
have a subjective right that was similar to a property right. The social 
function of these positions made them important and irremovable. This 
was done to protect the holders in their public function.
129
 Thus, it may 
have been in the context of public servants and office holders that 
Duguit first began to construct the social-function norm of property, or 
at least, where he first began to connect the two ideas. The public 
service link is certainly easier to see in this example when Duguit began 
to construct property-based arguments for these state positions.  
Duguit in l’État also distanced himself from socialism. While he 
recognized that property or ownership created at least two class owners 
and non-owners, Duguit did not believe that this necessarily led to class 
struggle between the two.
130
 Thus, although the work that was to 
establish Duguit’s position in the French and European intellectual 
world did not advance his later ideas of the social-function norm of 
property later found in the lectures, it indicated some of his nascent 
ideas about subjective rights, property, and the social function that were 
to come about in fuller form in 1911 in Buenos Aires. 
                                                                                                                     
126.  DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at v. 
127.  ―Le propriété n’est pas un droit subjectif; elle implique un ensemble de vouloirs 
juridiquement possible, indéfiniment renouvelables; elle est en vérité un état.‖ 1 DUGUIT, 
L’ÉTAT, supra note 118, at 205.  
128.  ―Le propriété n’est pas un droit subjectif; elle est un fait condition de pouvoirs 
objectifs, et cela, quel que soit le mode de constitution de la propriété.‖ Id. at 210-11. 
129.  Id. at 581-82. 
130.  Id. at 205-06. 
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Other works before the Buenos Aires lectures are even less useful in 
tracing Duguit’s thought about property. In 1908, Duguit published a 
series of three lectures given to the École des Hautes Études Sociales. 
Similar themes of social solidarity and the problem of subjective rights 
led to a discussion in his third lecture on classes and syndicalism.
131
 
Duguit was again careful to distance himself from both socialists and 
orthodox jurists.
132
 Nonetheless, these lectures from 1908 begin to 
reveal the greater influence of Comte and Durkheim in Duguit’s thought 
and writings, particularly as he built his ideas of social solidarity and 
social interdependence.
133
 
To complete a review of Duguit’s other works related to property, 
we must also consider Duguit’s treatise on constitutional law. By its 
second edition, this five-volume study published in the early 1920s 
served as an opportunity for Duguit to bring his previous work together 
and to provide newer insights and explorations of certain topic. Property 
and its nature, of course came up at several points in the study. Duguit 
repeated his assertions that property is not a subjective right and is a 
social function. Indeed, he noted that since World War I, recent events 
had proved him right as property owners, as capitalists, became social 
producers invested with a social function.
134
 A portion of the treatise on 
the relationship of the state to rights afforded Duguit the opportunity 
both to repeat and to expand his central thesis concerning property.
135
 
For example, Duguit analyzed in much greater depth than the Buenos 
Aires lectures afforded him the problems stemming from the enshrining 
of property as a right in the documents of the French Revolution, 
including the Declaration of 1789 and the Declaration of 1793.
136
 This 
work also gave Duguit the opportunity to discuss the social function of 
property quite broadly noting that property has a social role, and that 
limitations on property can only be explained adequately through ideas 
of social utility.
137
 Duguit repeated much of his earlier work here: The 
owner of property has a social function, and property has a social 
function. Duguit noted that he first asserted this theory in his lectures in 
1912.
138
 Duguit again recognized the main objection that there were few 
statutes  that compelled owners to put property to its social function, but 
 
                                                                                                                     
131.  LÉON DUGUIT, LE DROIT SOCIAL, LE DROIT INDIVIDUEL, ET LA TRANSFORMATION DE 
L’ÉTAT (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1908) [hereinafter LE DROIT SOCIAL].  
132.  Id. at 1-5. 
133.  Id. at 24, 115. 
134.  DUGUIT, DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, supra note 42, at 267. 
135.  Id. at 608-11. 
136.  Id. at 608-10. 
137.  Id. at 614, 618. 
138.  Id. at 618-19. 
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responded with the examples he provided in the second edition of his 
lectures as well as with some newer examples.
139
  
The treatise on constitutional law added little to Duguit’s earlier 
theory and assertions about the nature of property. If anything, they 
confirm that he was comfortable in the statements he made concerning 
property in the Buenos Aires lectures, and, in fact, he referred to them 
as being the source for his views on the subject. One benefit of the 
treatise was that it offered up-dated bibliographic materials on Duguit’s 
idea of the social-function norm. In addition to confirming his reliance 
on Comte, the treatise offers two other sources available to Duguit 
concerning the social function of property that he did not cite in the 
Buenos Aires lectures, works by Gide and Marguery.
140
 It is likely these 
works also influenced, in some way, Duguit’s development of the 
social-function norm. 
VI. WRITERS ON PROPERTY WHO INFLUENCED DUGUIT’S 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY 
There were also existing writers more narrowly focused on the 
social-function norm of property or ownership available to Duguit as he 
constructed his ideas on the topic. One likely influence was his friend 
and colleague Raymond Saleilles.
141
 In writing about rights, Saleilles 
had noted that an abuse of a right occurred when it was exercised 
contrary to its economic and social function.  
Saleilles wrote that ―from a social view point, any right is relative 
and there are no rights, not even property rights, which are absolute.‖142 
Saleilles was born in Beaune in 1855 and died in 1912. After studying 
law in Paris and obtaining his agrégation in 1884, he taught in Dijon for 
almost ten years before returning to teach in Paris.
143
 He was an open, 
ardent Catholic and an advocate of reforms for women and workers. His 
work often bridged French lay republican ideas and Catholic social 
thought.
144
 Saleilles considered law to be a social science and stated that 
the two elements of sociology were law and history.
145
 In this light, 
Saleilles thought that doctrinal writings on the law should lead to 
                                                                                                                     
139.  Id. at 620-24. 
140.  CHARLES GIDE, COURS D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE (Paris, Sirey 1909); E. MARGUERY, LE 
DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ ET LE RÉGIME DÉMOCRATIQUE (F. Alcan ed., Paris 1906). 
141.  Evsey S. Rashba, “Consecrated Ignorance of Foreign Law”?, 39 CAL. L. REV. 364 
(1951). 
142.  Id. at 364 n.44 (quoting and translating RAYMOND SALEILLES, ETUDE SUR LA THÉORIE 
GÉNÉRALE DE L’OBLIGATION 371 (3d ed. 1914). The first edition was published in 1890.). 
143.  DHJF, supra note 31, at 694. 
144.  Id. at 695. 
145.  Id. 
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changes in law by reflecting social facts and by keeping the collective 
conscience of the time in mind. His influence on his friend Duguit can 
be noted not only in Duguit’s work generally, but also when Duguit 
turns to particular areas studied by Saleilles as examples, such as the 
abuse of right, contracts of adhesion, and foundations.
146
 
According to Duguit, his own construction of an idea of the social-
function norm of property was built on the work of others. We know 
that for the general proposition, Duguit cited and quoted Comte.
147
 He 
then pointed the reader to four other works by the following authors: 
Aldolphe Landry, Maurice Hauriou, Henri Hayem, and Joseph 
Charmont.
148
 Each work must be considered in Duguit’s construction of 
the social-function norm of property, and each provides important 
insights into the way Duguit came to the social-function definition. 
The earliest work Duguit cited was Adolphe Landry’s L’utilité 
sociale de la propriété individual.
149
 Despite its promising title in 
relationship to our interests, the work is an economic analysis of 
individual ownership that only addressed the relationship between 
property and society in the broadest sense. The work is really about 
profits from production, capitalization, productivity, the distribution of 
wealth and economic inequality.
150
 At several points in the book, 
Landry noted that private property created opposition between private 
interests and social interests and that a change in the regime of private 
ownership might produce social benefits.
151
 Although he theoretically 
advocated a shift toward collective property, Landry argued against the 
complete socialization of production.
152
 Duguit probably gave too much 
credit to Landry in his construction of the social-function norm of 
property. Some important ideas concerning property’s relationship to 
society are found in Landry’s work, but Duguit’s ideas are clearly much 
more definite and more fully constructed than Landry’s passing 
comments. Despite the title of Landry’s work, it must have contributed 
little to Duguit’s work in constructing the social function of property. 
Duguit also cited the work of his intellectual sparring partner, 
Maurice Hauriou, to construct his vision of the social-function norm of 
property. Hauriou addressed property in a general discussion of rights in 
his textbook on public law, Principes de droit public.
153
 Hauriou stated 
                                                                                                                     
146.  Id. 
147.  DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 158-59. 
148.  Id. at 159. 
149.  LANDRY, ADOLPHE, L’UTILITÉ SOCIALE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDIVIDUELLE (Paris, Société 
Nouvelle de Librairie et d’Edition 1901). 
150.  Id. at xii, 407. 
151.  Id. at xii, 107-08, 148-49, 250-51, 405. 
152.  Id. at 130, 153, 250, 408-09. 
153.  MAURICE HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC (Paris, Sirey 1910). 
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that rights were a combination of three elements: interest, power, and 
function. The particular balance of these elements was worked out in 
relationship to society.
154
 Indeed, Hauriou expanded the term ―function‖ 
at points in his writing to the term ―fonction sociale‖ and stated that this 
aspect was also tied to public function.
155
 Hauriou used this three-
element scheme to analyze various rights such as being a witness and 
voting. He left his discussion of the right of property, ―the most 
individualist of rights,‖ for last.156 
Concerning property, Hauriou stated that the element of function 
was hidden.
157
 His work then explored the possibilities of finding the 
function aspect of property. Like Duguit, Hauriou noted that the 
legislature did not seem too concerned that owners of farm lands did not 
cultivate them.
158
 Nonetheless, Hauriou argued, lands were subject to 
equal inheritance and could not be subject to entails. Such lands were 
widely distributed and were easily transferrable.
159
 Therefore, the 
function element of property was provided by the market; all these 
things were part of property’s function of economic production.160 
Hauriou even drew on the term latifundia to drive home this economic 
function of property.
161
 Hauriou used less common examples to 
demonstrate further the economic or social function of property. These 
included property subject to expropriation, Algerian concessions 
requiring exploitation of the property, and literary and artistic rights.
162
 
If Landry’s work pointed Duguit in the direction of the social, 
Hauriou might have led Duguit in the direction of a function. Hauriou’s 
work left off at defining property’s function as economic, rather than 
fully social, and his reliance on the market and the economic function of 
property within the market is a significant difference from Duguit’s 
approach. Although he recognized that the function of rights could be, 
at times, social or public, he did not extend this analysis to property. 
Several other aspects, however, of Hauriou’s analysis are similar to 
Duguit’s exposition on property. The theme of uncultivated farmland in 
itself and in the face of legislative inaction was repeated by Duguit as a 
possible critique of the social-function norm. Hauriou was not bothered 
                                                                                                                     
154.  Id. at 36. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. at 38. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. at 38-39. 
161.  ―On ne redoute même pas, à raison de cette préoccupation, les latifundia qui se 
vendraient très mal; chacun a intérêt a entretenir son domaine en rapport et il en est qui se 
ruinent à cet entretien. Donc, tout a été fort habilement calculé pour que la fonction économique 
de la propriété fût assurée par la seul jeu de la liberté.‖ Id. at 39. 
162.  Id. 
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by the unproductive holding of land, because he settled on property 
having an economic function and decided that other legislation ensured 
that the market would handle such unproductive property. This, 
however, created problems for Duguit’s concept of property as a social 
function because uncultivated farmland produced social harms, even if 
the market would eventually force the property into production. 
It is likely that the third source listed by Duguit, a doctoral 
dissertation of Henri Hayem was the most influential work on Duguit’s 
construction of the social function of property. The work is a clear, in-
depth study of the topic, and even provided a summary of Duguit’s own 
writings on the topic until 1910, the date of the dissertation. The 
president of Hayem’s committee was Professor Delsandres, and the two 
other examiners were Professors Eugene Gaudemet and Ernest 
Champeaux.
163
  
Hayem’s work linked ownership with a social function and 
mentioned Duguit in connection with this idea. Hayem did not cite any 
particular work of Duguit’s, but it seems clear that these ideas were 
drawn from the passages on property from l’État discussed above. With 
attribution to Duguit, Hayem wrote: ―Property is not an object of a 
right. It the object of a duty. The owner exercises a social function.‖164 
Hayem’s main point in the study was that the right to property was 
becoming more and more relative and that an absolute right of property 
should be rejected.
165
 The work attempted to chart this change through 
French and European legal history from feudalism to the present.
166
 The 
first section of the work addressed feudalism and concluded that it 
provided a period of absence of limitations on property leading to 
waste.
167
 Importantly, for the work and for Duguit’s conclusions, 
Hayem noted the early conflation of public and private rights to 
property.
168
  
The second section of the work set out the shift from absolute to 
relative rights to property.
169
 Here, Hayem provided a detailed study of 
property rights during the French Revolution and how they became 
absolute. Hayem paid particular attention to the sources of this principle 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
163.  HENRI HAYEM, ESSAI SUR LE DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ ET SES LIMITES cover page (Thèse 
pour le doctorat. Université de Dijon, Faculté de Droit. 1910).  
164.  ―Le propriété n’est pas l’objet d’un droit. C’ést l’objet d’un devoir. Le propriétaire 
exerce une fonction sociale.‖ Id. at 425 (emphasis in original). 
165.  Id. at v. 
166.  Id. at v-vi. 
167.  ―De l’absence de limites à l’émiettement.‖ Id. at 3-163. 
168.  Id. at 16, 149, 162-63. 
169.  Id. at 165-439. 
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and the competing schools of philosophical thought that attempted to 
characterize property as in the period.
170
  
Even in the period attributed to the creation of absolute rights, 
Hayem found some evidence that some revolutionary thinkers were 
planting a social-function norm for property. Hayem quoted the 
revolutionary legal thinker Hentz to reveal this other trend about 
property: ―Property is the fundamental social law, but the rights that it 
gives should be seen less in relation to the one who enjoys them than [in 
relation to] those in society for whose benefit it was created.‖171 This 
passage gave Hayem the opportunity to discuss the idea of property 
being instituted for social utility and how this idea conflicted with the 
absolute nature of property constructed in the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man.
172
 
Just as Duguit moved from the Declaration to the Code, Hayem next 
discussed the absolute nature of property under the Code civil stating 
that ―[t]he French civil code represents the most comprehensive 
expression of the absolutist theory of the right of property.‖173 He then 
explored the underlying nature of property expressed in the code and 
noted that Portalis’s view of property as a natural right was established 
in line with the influences of Locke and Grenier.
174
 Portalis authored the 
language creating the absolute right to property in the Code, found in 
article 544, ―as the right to enjoy and to dispose of things in the most 
absolute manner.‖175 Hayem asserted that while Portalis’s view, and 
thus Locke’s view, established the natural law foundations of property 
in the code, it was Rousseau’s social origins view that was used in 
interpretation of the code provision on property after its enactment.
176
 
Various examples of limitations on property by the state, such as 
expropriation, taxation, and restrictions on succession, led Hayem to his 
hypothesis of a relative right.
177
 He expressed the relative right theory 
this  way:  ―It  is, on the contrary, a relative doctrine, since property as a 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
170.  Id. at 165-250. 
171.  ―La propriété est la première loi social, mais le droit qu’elle donne doit être envisagé 
moins sous le rapport de celui qui en jouit que sous celui de la société pour l’utilité de laquelle 
elle a été instituée.‖ Id. at 217-18 (citing Hentz, Rapport (1793), Arch. nat., AD, xviii, c. 326). 
172.  Id. at 218. 
173.  ―Le Code civil français représente l’expression la plus complète de la théorie 
absolutiste du droit de propriété.‖ Id. at 250. 
174.  Id. at 52-253. 
175.  ―[C]omme le droit de jouir et de disposer des choses à la manière la plus absolue.‖ Id. 
at 252 (citing Exposé de motifs du projet du Code Civil, tit. II, liv. II in 8 LOCRÉ, LA 
LEGISLATION CIVILE DE LA FRANCE 151). 
176.  Id. at 253. 
177.  Id. at 260-98. 
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private right finds itself limited by property as a public right and is 
subordinated to the latter.‖178 
Keeping to the philosophical trends concerning property throughout 
its history, Hayem next turned to the different schools of thought related 
to property as of 1910.
179
 This approach provided him the opportunity 
to discuss the views of, among others, Bentham, Mill, Savigny, Ihering, 
Comte, socialist thinkers, the Catholic Church, and Herbert Spencer.
180
 
At several points in the text, Hayem drew the connection of property 
and its social function. For example, after citing a passage by Ihering on 
expropriation, Hayem wrote: ―Thus, the right of property, like all other 
private rights, is not a natural right, not an individual right, but a social 
right.‖181 
Hayem also noted the development of a school that attacked these 
questions from a different or newer manner in terms of property’s 
relationship to the state. Here, the main influences were Comte, Saint-
Simon, Spencer, Durkheim, Courcelle-Seneuil.
182
 His summary of this 
section led Hayem to ask a question in similar terms to Duguit: ―If, 
then, property imposes a social function, what is the importance of this 
social function?‖183 
After noting various legislative limitations on property, Hayem then 
asked the political question of the day: does all this lead to socialism?
184
 
He answered by saying that it was difficult to see the future, and 
although certain elements of the social platform had come to pass, such 
as the expropriation of church holdings, he believed the means of 
production would stay in private hands.
185
 He then discussed the 
expansion of social property (propriété sociale) in this light.
186
 
Nonetheless, like Duguit and others working on a middle way between 
absolute property rights and socialism, Hayem indicated that a social-
function norm was not necessarily the path to socialism: ―And so, a 
point to be emphasized again: the possibility of socializing property, 
without thereby adopting socialist doctrines.‖187 
                                                                                                                     
178.  ―C’est, au contraire, une doctrine relativiste, puisque la propriété de droit privé s’y 
trouve limitée par la propriété de droit public et même subordinée à cette dernière.‖ Id. at 321. 
179.  Id. at 325-56. 
180.  Id. at 325-47. 
181.  ―Ainsi, le droit de propriété, comme tous les autres droits privés, est non un droit 
naturel, un droit individuel, mais un droit social.‖ Id. at 333 (emphasis in original). 
182.  Id. at 347-56. 
183.  ―Si, en effet, la propriété impose une fonction sociale, quelle sera l’importance de 
cette fonction sociale?‖ Id. at 355. 
184.  Id. at 418.  
185.  Id. at 418-19. 
186.  Id. at 420-22. 
187.  ―Enfin, un point est à retentir encore: c’est la possibilité de socialiser la propriété, 
sans adopter pour cela les doctrines socialistes.‖ Id. at 438. 
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It is at this point in his study, near its end, that Hayem offers 
Duguit’s analysis and conclusions about property presented at the 
beginning of this section.
188
 The idea of the social function of 
ownership was advanced by Hayem through brief discussion of the idea 
of the owner as social functionary (foncionnaire social).
189
 Hayem 
concluded his work with ideas that very closely follow what Duguit was 
to propose. In part, he concluded: ―And so, from fight to fight, and from 
transformation to transformation, one moves toward a form of society 
where private property really is the object of a social function.‖190 
In Hayem’s dissertation we find many of the ideas on property 
Duguit presented in his lecture. They are set out clearly and often in 
substantial detail. Indeed, Hayem’s summary of Duguit’s work on 
property until the date of the dissertation is an important link between 
the two authors. Hayem, the student, read and cited Duguit, and, in turn, 
Duguit, and established professor, cited Hayem, author of a well-
executed dissertation. 
Of the works cited by Duguit, Hayem’s dissertation is by far the 
closest and fullest source for the philosophical background on property 
and the rise of property as an absolute right out of the French 
Revolution, the important observations concerning the public and 
private law in relation to the conception of property, and the fullest and 
most similar statements linking property to a social function. In 
Hayem’s dissertation, the reader finds what must have been a useful and 
influential source in Duguit’s lectures. 
The final work Duguit cited as contributing to his construction of the 
idea of the social function norm was by Joseph Charmont. In a book 
dedicated to Salielles, Charmont tackled the same general topic of 
Duguit’s lectures. Charmont’s approach was, however, quite different. 
Charmont focused on changes in the civil law in the areas of marriage, 
family, and children. The work also addressed property in a chapter 
entitled ―The right of private property since the code civil: More and 
more restrictions on the right of the owner.‖191 Far from expounding a 
social-function norm of property, Charmont linked these restrictions to 
the fact that owners did not live alone, but must co-exist with others.
192
 
Over the next thirty or so pages of the book, Charmont provided a list of 
examples where the absolute use of property is limited by some sort of 
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restriction.
193
 His examples included: maintaining walls, garbage 
dumps, unhealthy releases of materials, piles of dirt from landslides, 
construction waste, dangerous animals,
194
 brothels, and excavations 
without reason.
195
 He used these examples to demonstrate that 
ownership is not absolute, as propounded by Ihering, and that when 
such uses are balanced, as in the doctrinal writings of Demolombe, 
Aubry and Rau, Blondel, and Baudry-Lancantinerie, the public use or 
purposes usually won the day.
196
 Charmont continued the book with 
more in-depth discussions of building restrictions that Paris and other 
large cities had since 1902,
197
 restrictions on cultivation,
198
 
expropriations,
199
 mining,
200
 and water rights, particularly in 
relationship to their use for industrial power.
201
 Charmont’s work is, in 
essence, an inventory of limitations on the use of property. He provided 
no general conclusion tying these restrictions to public use or a social 
function for property. Thus, the work provided plenty of examples, 
some of which might have supported a shift towards a social-function 
norm of property, but other than the general observation that property 
was no longer absolute, the work gave no theoretical guidance, 
language, or suggestions to Duguit for the construction of his new 
characterization of property. 
Of the four works cited, Hayem’s dissertation must have been, by 
far, the most influential as Duguit sat down to write his lecture on 
property for Buenos Aires. Hayem’s historical and philosophical 
analysis must have been particularly useful to Duguit. Hayem, like 
Duguit, linked property to a social function, without the directness of 
expression one finds Duguit’s words. The other works cited indicate 
that various parts of Duguit’s concept of the social-function norm were 
being developed and thought about by others at the time. The works of 
Landry, Hauriou, and Charmont played supporting roles in the 
construction of the idea. Hauriou tied property to a social function that 
was economic. Charmont provided numerous examples indicating that 
property had been restricted by various social demands.  
Two other works were likely used by Duguit in the construction of 
his theory. These works were not mentioned in the published version of 
the lectures, but were cited in 1923 when Duguit published his ideas 
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about property in the Traité de droit constitutionnel.
202
 For works 
pointing to the social foundations of individual property published 
before his book of the Buenos Aires lectures, Duguit cited Charles Gide 
and E. Marguery in addition to the works by Landry and Hayem.  
Gide’s work provided a broad study of political economy for 
university students.
203
 In his discussion of ways of acquiring property 
and other general principles concerning property, Gide briefly touched 
on property’s social utility.204 He wrote: ―Only if such is the basis of the 
right of property, it follows that the individual is not the owner for 
himself, but for society, in that property is, in both the most august and 
literal sense, a public function.‖205 Within this context, Gide examined 
the prevailing views of property and described how socialist and 
communist structures consider property.
206
 He also spent considerable 
space to discuss owners of agricultural land (propriétares fonciers) and 
their place in political economics.
207
  
Gide’s contribution to Duguit’s construction of the social function 
norm of property must have been limited. He repeated the ideas of 
public function and social utility for property in its relationship to 
society, but did not expand on these ideas in a way that would help 
Duguit build his theory. Gide’s work was, at best, general support for 
the ideas Duguit developed fully in his lectures. 
The second extant work Duguit cited in the constitutional treatise of 
1923 but did not cite in the publication of the lectures was a book by 
Marguery on the right of property and its relationship to democracy.
208
 
In addition to the work of Comte, this is another early work cited by 
Duguit that used the phrase ―social function‖ (fonction sociale), which 
Marguery used in connection with the cultivation of land.
209
 Marguery’s 
main concern was to move property towards serving democratic 
institutions, and in studying the possibilities for property, he recognized 
many of the recent changes and restrictions on property.
210
 Thus, 
writing in 1906, Marguery thought that it was ―time to investigate the 
social advantages of the right of property.‖211 
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Like Duguit, Marguery saw problems in the absolutist construction 
of property rights. Marguery criticized the present constructions of 
property rights where every owner of property considered himself ―not 
as the holder of social capital, but as a king of an independent province 
where he uses and abuses it at his whim.‖212 
In Marguery’s view, legislative change was not necessary to effect 
change because under recent French law, the owner of property was 
already far from being someone who enjoyed absolute rights.
213
 
Marguery, like his contemporaries, rallied examples to demonstrate that, 
in some situations, the private interest had to yield to the general 
interest.
214
 His examples included water rights; forests; taxes on wine, 
alcohol, and tobacco; municipal rules requiring the maintenance of 
property, rights to light and air, and construction restrictions.
215
 The 
work then presents short chapters treating some other areas where 
property was pushed in the service of democracy: hunting, fishing, 
mining, forests, waters, and farmland.
216
 The final portion of the book 
addressed early land reform efforts to limit the size of large estates in 
favor of smaller estates. His examples here were drawn from European 
law and legislation, but they reveal the then nascent possibility of tying 
social function to agrarian reform that was to flourish later in the 
century.
217
 
It is interesting that Duguit did not cite Marguery in the publication 
of his lectures as a source for the social function of property. Although 
the work tried to move property in the direction of democratic 
institutions, it did so by generally asserting the social function of the 
property in various contexts. Indeed, Marguery appears to have been 
one of the first writers, along with Comte, to use the term social 
function in connection with property. His rejection of absolutist 
constructions of property and his use of examples to demonstrate the 
supremacy of the public interest concerning property rights were 
significant steps in ideas Duguit later presented in the Buenos Aires 
lectures. 
Duguit’s social-function theory of property was the product of 
several French scholars who thought and wrote about property in the 
first decade or so of the twentieth century. Duguit was able to construct 
his clear and forceful exposition of the social-function norm out of a 
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body of work that had recently developed. In many ways, Duguit’s 
contribution was to synthesize these ideas and craft them into his own 
unified approach to modern property. These were fresh and new ideas 
with a very short intellectual history. New sociological approaches to 
law and methods based on the observation of law in action in recent 
decisions by courts and legislatures led to Duguit’s construction of the 
social-obligation norm. Duguit credited this approach to the work of 
others. He was a careful and sometimes generous scholar attributing his 
idea to the many contemporary works around him. Duguit did not 
construct the social-function norm of property out of whole cloth. He 
did, however, give it a clarity of form built from various sources, and he 
strongly advocated its descriptive utility. His Buenos Aires lectures 
were the most coherent expression of the idea, and their publication can 
properly be thought of as a milestone in the history of the idea. The 
lectures, because of their author, their clarity in advocating an idea, and 
their wide availability in French, English, and Spanish were key to the 
spread of the social-function norm of property. 
VII. BEYOND DUGUIT AND THE SOCIAL-FUNCTION NORM: 
SOCIAL PROPERTY 
As Duguit viewed the social-function norm as a limitation on private 
property and as a defining aspect of private property itself, other 
thinkers of the period were using the idea of ―the social‖ to expand 
traditional ideas of what property was.
218
 These thinkers created a 
modern, broad conception of ―social property‖ to mean ―security‖ for 
workers through mandated contributions to a government system 
providing minimum funds for benefits such as pensions or social 
housing.
219
 These new concepts of social property went far beyond the 
ideas of limiting unused land or even socializing land through agrarian 
reform programs. The conception of this kind of property was not yet 
known in the eighteenth century or even during most of the nineteenth 
century.
220
 It was the kind of property labeled ―new property‖ by 
Charles Reich in a well-known and influential article published by Yale 
Law Journal in 1964.
221
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Although much more assertive in their socialization of property and 
in their expansive definition of property, these ideas were not more 
recent expansions from the work of Duguit. This social property was 
not individual property limited by social function following Duguit’s 
view, but was rather an analogue of private property for non-owners.
222
 
Despite the collective burden placed on this type of property, it was not 
social property in the sense of a socialist call to reapportion the products 
of work.
223
 Instead, like Duguit’s view, this kind of social property 
sought to strike a middle way between capitalist liberalism and 
collectivism.
224
 
Perhaps the most eminent of the thinkers and writers to advance this 
notion of ―social property‖ was Durkheim himself.225 As Castel and 
Haroche have pointed out, there was most likely a link between 
Durkheim’s creation of the field of sociology and this new kind of 
property.
226
 For Durkheim, the modern conditions of the division of 
labor, urbanization, and the wage-earning society led to the need for 
social solidarity.
227
 The proper role of the state, then, was to maintain 
social cohesion.
228
 This kind of social property was a late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century response to the modern pauperism of the 
nineteenth century.
229
 Although eighteenth-century precursors like 
Locke and Rousseau hinted at the relationships between property, the 
individual, and society, this notion of social property was produced as a 
response to nineteenth-century economic and social conditions.
230
  
This idea of social property was a parallel and related development 
to Duguit’s ideas about the social-function norm. As early as 1884, 
Alfred Fouillée’s La propriété sociale et la démocratie advanced this 
kind of social property by suggesting that the state could demand from 
workers minimum amounts so that a proletarian class of individuals 
sentenced to servitude and prone to rebellion would not form.
231
 
Considering its title and its relation to Duguit’s and our topic, it is 
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noteworthy that Duguit did not use this work as a source for his ideas of 
the social-function norm. Fouillée’s work is similar to Duguit’s in its 
rejection of socialism and in its attempt to find a middle way between 
purely capitalist and purely socialist property.
232
 Fouillée characterized 
this as property’s individual and social function.233 For Fouillée, both 
forms of property lead to democracy and in this context he made an 
early use of the term ―propriété sociale‖ or ―social property.‖234 From 
this point, Fouillée critiqued socialism but then moved on to an in-depth 
analysis of social assistance programs, the right to work, and 
insurance.
235
 Instead of moving back to the question of property in 
relationship to these elements, Fouillée next addressed the democratic 
process, universal suffrage, and the place of education in 
democracies.
236
 Thus, considering its early treatment of the topic, its 
mention of social property, and its similar middle-way approach to 
capitalism and socialism, it is somewhat odd that Duguit did not list 
Fouillée work as a source for his ideas of the social-function norm. 
Perhaps Duguit found Fouillée went too far in his description of social 
property and the programmatic aspects of property that Fouillée’s work 
advocated. Even among writers putting forth a middle ground between 
the individual and the social, there were differences in approach, 
analysis, and goals that may have led to their exclusion from Duguit’s 
initial works. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although Duguit was the most articulate speaker on behalf of the 
social-obligation norm of property and his position as a well-respected 
law professor aided in his efforts to disseminate the idea, he was not the 
only person involved in the construction and study of the idea. Until 
now, Henri Hayem’s work has been underappreciated in the 
development of the idea. Much of Duguit’s approach and analysis of the 
idea of property’s social function followed Hayem’s work. Duguit was 
not a plagiarist; he cited Hayem as one of his sources. Nonetheless, 
Hayem should be restored as a central influence on Duguit’s thought 
and as one of the main proponents of the idea of the social-function 
norm. 
Other contemporary thinkers on property and its social aspects also 
left their mark on Duguit’s work and formulation. A constellation of 
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thinkers including Saleilles, Landry, Hauriou, and Charmont also 
shaped Duguit’s work on property. Still other writers, such as Comte, 
Durkheim, and Gide, provided modern, general approaches to observing 
and writing about law in a social context. They added to Duguit’s 
understanding of rights, property, and the social function.  
The social-function norm influenced ideas of property around the 
world since its formulation in the early twentieth century. It was to have 
profound importance in European and Latin American constitutional 
thought. In the United States, the idea has experienced a recent rebirth 
as an alternative discourse to a long tradition of absolute property rights. 
The social-function norm of property, as expounded and advanced by 
Duguit, Hayem, and others, continues as an important theory of 
property today, especially as property rights are defined and enshrined 
in constitutions or in civil codes. A full understanding of the idea’s 
historical development and of its proper attribution is essential for 
further scholarship in the field. Such an understanding is also essential 
for those who would seek to implement the social-function norm of 
property in legal systems or use it as a point of departure for critiquing 
legal systems in which absolute rights-based approaches are dominant.  
 
